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In a certain respect, the discussions about sense perception are at the center 
of philosophical change in the seventeenth century. To illustrate this it suf-
fi ces to look at the First Meditation of René Descartes:
Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired ei-
ther from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have 
found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust complete-
ly those who have deceived us even once.1
What Descartes is suspicious of is foremost any knowledge coming from 
the sense organs, and thus questioning the validity of sense perception 
is at the forefront of his thought. Th ough the meditator does not say this 
anywhere explicitly, he thus implicitly criticizes the Aristotelian under-
standing of the world. Th e Aristotelian understanding is explicated in the 
beginning of Metaphysics:
All men naturally desire knowledge.2 An indication of this is our es-
teem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their 
own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to ac-
tion, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, general-
ly speaking, to all the other senses. Th e reason for this is that of all the 
senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions.3
Th e article has been written with the support of the Target Financed Program no 
SF0180040s08.
1  René Descartes, Th e philosophical writings of Descartes, 2, trans. by John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff , and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 12 [AT VII 18].
2  When considering the translation proposed by Martin Heidegger (Sein und Zeit, 171) 
who renders εἰδέναι as “to see”, the connection between senses and knowledge about 
the world is even stronger.
3  Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. by Hugh Tredennick, vol. 17–18, Aristotle in 23 volumes 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), 1.980a. Cf. the Latin translation of 
Basilios Bessarion: “Omnes homines natura scire desiderant. Signum autem est sensuum 
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Th us the question about the scope and usefulness of senses becomes one of 
the main discussion points during the seventeenth century, not only due to 
Aristotelians and Cartesians but also due to Hobbes’ stress on sense percep-
tion,  Spinoza’s understanding of the inadequacy of the senses, and Locke’s 
later reinterpretation of the old concept of tabula rasa. Such ambivalence 
towards sense perception is also present in the seventeenth-century dis-
putations of Academia Gustaviana and Academia Gustavo-Carolina. As 
subjects, sense organs and perception are mentioned in eight disputations 
of varying quality and length (8 to 40 pages).4
Table 1. Disputations of Academia Gustaviana and Gustavo-Carolina dealing with sense 
organs and perception
Schomerus, Petrus [P]  –  Ulfsbeckius (Ulsbeckius), Magnus (Magnus Paulinus) [R]
Disputatio inauguralis, de anima sensitiva in genere, et in specie de sensibus exte-
rioribus, quam ... in Regia Gustaviana, quae Dorpati … est, Academia, ... sub prae-
sidio ... Petri Schomeri ... pro summo in philosophia gradu, ... publicae disquisitioni 
submittit Magnus Paulinus Ulsbeckius ... ad diem 15. Octob. ... – Dorpati Livonorum, 
1634 : J. Pistorius. [20] p.  4°.
Grat.: Petrus A. Schomerus, Johannes Raulinius 
Schomerus, Petrus [P]  –  Lerbeckius, Ericus [A & R]
Disputatio philosophica de sensibus in genere et in specie de externis: quam, ... in 
Regia Academia Gustaviana, quae Dorpati est ... sub praesidio ... Petri A. Schomeri, ... 
publicae … disquisitioni, ad diem [31. Octo]bris, ... submittit Ericus Petri Lerbeckius, 
... author et respondens. – Dorpati Livonorum, 1638 : Lit. acad. [16] p.  4°.
Grat.: Ericus Matthiae, Johannes E. Stregn.  
Savonius, Michael [P]  –  Lerbeckius, Ericus [R]
Disputatio philosophica de sensibus internis; quam, ... in Regia Academia Gustavi-
ana, quae Dorpati … est sub praesidio ... Michaelis Savonii, ... pro magisterii philo-
sophici privilegiis et immunitatibus consequendis, publicae disquisitioni et censurae, 
ad diem [16] Octob. ... submittit Ericus Petri Lerbeckius, ... – Dorpati Livonorum, 
1639 : Typ. acad. [16] p.  4°.
Grat.: Laurentius Ludenius, Isacus Sicrenius  
dilectio nam et absque usu propter seipsos amantur prae ceteris autem qui per oculos fi t. 
Non enim ut agamus solum, verum etiam nil acturi, ipsum videre prae omnibus aliis, 
ut ita dicam eligimus, causa autem est, quod sensuum hic vel maxime nos cognoscere 
quicquam facit multasque diff erentias manifestat.” Aristoteles, Aristotelis Stagiritae 
Metaphysicorvm Libri XIIII, Bessarione interprete (Lvgdvni [Lyon]: Iuntae, 1579), 3–4.
4   Th ese descriptions of disputations rely on the bibliography of Ene-Lille Jaanson, 
Tartu Ülikooli trükikoda 1632–1710: ajalugu ja trükiste bibliograafi a = Druckerei der 
Universität Dorpat 1632–1710: Geschichte und Bibliographie der Druckschrift en (Tartu: 
Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogu, 2000).
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Johannes Erici Stregnensis (Stiernstråle) [P]  –  Uraelius, Faderus [A & R]
Disputatio physica de visu, quam ... in Regia Academia Gustaviana, quae Dorpati est 
... 21. Octobris, anno 1643. ... publice … praeside ... Johanne Erici Stregnensi, ... pro-
ponit Faderus Arvidi Uraelius, ... author et respondens. – Dorpati Livonorum, 1643 
: Typ. acad. [8] p.  4°. 
Johannes Erici Stregnensis (Stiernstråle) [P]  –  Emzelius, Laurentius [R]
Disputatio physica de sensibus in genere, et de auditu in specie; quam ... in Regia 
Academia Gustaviana, quae Dorpati … est ... praeside ... Johanne Erici Stregnensi, ... 
publicae ventilationi submittit Laurentius Erici Emzelius, ... die [   ] Aug. ... – Dor-
pati Livonorum, 1645 : J. Vogelius. [12] p.  4°. 
Preusius (Preutius, Preuss), Georgius [P]  –  Halenus (Klingius), Johannes [R]
Disputatio psychologica de sensibus; quam, ... in ... Academia Gustaviana, sub prae-
sidio ... Georgii Preusii, ... publico … examini submittit Johannes Steph. Klingius, auc-
tor et respondens, ad diem [  ] Junii ... – Dorpati Livonorum, 1655 : J. Vogelius. [16] p.  4°.
Grat.: praeses (Georgius Preusius) 
Sjöberg, Gabriel [P]  –  Westerman, Andreas [R]
Dissertatio philosophica de erroribus sensuum, quam ... in Regia Academia Gustavi-
ano-Carolina Dorpatensi, praeside ... Gabriele Siöberg, ... publico examini subjicere 
constituit ... Andreas Westerman ... ad diem 18. Junii anni MDCXCII. ... – Dorpati, 
[1692] : J. Brendeken. [40] p.  4°.
Ded.: Nicolaus Gyllenstålpe 
Dau, Michael [P]  –  Carstenius, Abrahamus [A & R]
Exercitatio physica de sensibus brutorum, quam ... in … Pernaviensi Academia, 
sub moderamine ...  Michaelis Dau, ... publico examini … ad d. [  ] anni M.DC.
LXXXXIX. ... submittit Abrah. P. Carstenius, ... auctor et respondens. – Pernaviae, 
[1699] : J. Brendeken. [4], 32, [4] p.  4°.
Ded.: Nicolaus Gyllenstålpe
Grat.: Gabriel Siöberg, praeses (Michael Dau), Andreas Strandenius, Nicolaus Ursi-
nus, A. Willander, Joh. Martini Uddgreen, Marcus Helsingius
Th ough some of these works can be considered medical5 or dealing with 
psychology, the aim of the present essay is to analyze these disputations 
as refl ections of the changes in thinking that took place in the seventeenth 
century – in other words, philosophically.
As it appears from Table 1, those disputations cover the period begin-
ning from two years aft er the establishing of the Academia (1634) until its 
relocation to Pärnu (1699). Th ese works can be divided very broadly into 
two categories. Th e fi rst six (from the years 1634–55) deal with Aristotelian 
physics and the last two (1692 and 1699) take their starting point foremost 
5  Kaarina Rein, “Andreas Arvidi disputatsioon De natura et constitutione medicinae 
arstiteadusliku mõtte arengu peegeldajana 17. sajandi Tartu ülikoolis”, Mäetagused, 39 
(2008), 2, 16.
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from the theories of Descartes and other Cartesian authors. Th e disputa-
tion of Westerman is a thorough exposition of the Cartesian understanding 
of perception, and the work of Carstenius (about the senses of the brutes6) 
presents the ideas of Descartes in the forms of theses and antitheses and 
off ering also some critique.
Th ough the Cartesian turn has oft en been described as an outcome 
of the skeptical (Pyrrhonic) attitude towards thinking, and thus result-
ing from applying methodological doubt to the sciences,7 the aim of the 
present essay is to show how one of the main diff erences between Carte-
sian and Aristotelian worldviews arose not from methodological doubt 
but from diff erences in understanding sense perception. For this purpose 
I have examined mainly two of the disputations – those of Magnus Ulfs-
beckius and Andreas Westerman – and compared the contrasting philo-
sophical backgrounds that are evident from the exposition of the problem 
of perception.
Th e Aristotelian worldview is apparently best presented in the dispu-
tation of Magnus Ulfsbeckius De anima sensitiva in genere, et in specie de 
sensibus exterioribus (About the sensitive soul and especially about exterior 
senses), written under the supervision of Petrus Schomerus. Th is dispu-
tation was presented for an academic degree (pro gradu) and it is also the 
earliest and longest of the Academia Gustaviana works on sense perception. 
Magnus Ulfsbeckius had already matriculated in 1627 in Uppsala, and from 
1633 was continuing his studies in Tartu.8 It appears also that later works 
dealing with the same subject used this work as a reference as they contain 
some sections that are very similar to the work of Ulfsbeckius. Th is can 
admittedly also be due to the fact that the authors use similar literature.
6  Carstenius brings out the etymology brutum ex βρωτός.
7  Tartu Ülikooli ajalugu 1632–1982, I, ed. by Helmut Piirimäe (Tallinn: Valgus, 1982), 
104b; Descartes ja tema ideede jõudmine Baltimaile 17. sajandil ja 18. sajandi algul: René 
Descartes’i 400. sünniaastapäevale pühendatud näitus Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogus, 
aprill–juuni 1996 = Descartes und der Eingang Seiner Ideen in die Schwedischen Ostsee-
provinzen Estland und Livland im 17. und Frühen 18. Jahrhundert: Ausstellung aus Anlass 
des 400. Jubiläums von René Descartes in der Universitätsbibliothek Tartu von April bis 
Juni 1996, ed. by Arvo Tering et. al. (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Raamatukogu, 1996), 21.
8  Album academicum der Universität Dorpat (Tartu) 1632–1710, ed. by Arvo Tering 
(Tallinn: Valgus, 1984), no. 127 (152).
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Table 2. Th e literature cited by Magnus Ulfsbeckius in his disputation De anima sensi-
tiva in genere, et in specie de sensibus exterioribus9
Author Work cited Notes
Aristotle Aristotelis Physicae ausculta-
tionis lib. 8. De Coelo 4. De Gener. 
et Corruptione 2. Meteorologico-
rum 4. De Mundo 1. De Anima 3. 
De Sensu et sensibilibus, lib.1. De 
Memoria et reminiscentia 1. De 
Somno et vigilia 1. De Insomniis 1. 
De Diuinatione per somnum 1. De 
Iuuentute, senectute, vita et morte 
1. De Respiratione 1. De Lo[n]gitu-
dine et breuitate vitae 1
Hieronymus 
Cardanus
De varietate rerum † 1576, Italian mathematician, 
astrologer, alchemist (Tartu 
Ülikooli ajalugu, I, 211a)
Caelius 
Aurelianus [?]
fl . 5th century, Roman physi-
can
Jacopo 
Zabarella
De rebus naturalibus libri XXX † 1589, Italian logician and 
interpreter of Aristotle (Tartu 
Ülikooli ajalugu, I, 186)
Julius Caesar 
Scaliger
Exotericarum Exercitationum † 1558, Italian philosopher 
(interpreter of Aristotle) 
and medic (Tartu Ülikooli 
ajalugu, I, 202, 216a, 237b)
Fortunio Liceti De ortu animae humanae libri tres † 1657, Italian medical scien-
tist and interpreter of Aristo-
tle, described transmission of 
characteristics, supporter of 
abiogenesis
Johannes 
Magirius
Physica peripatetica ex Aristotele, 
eiusque interpretibus collecta, et 
in sex libros distincta
† 1596, popular  interpreter of 
Aristotle, pupil of Zabarella, 
active in the Lutheran Uni-
versity of  Marburg (Tartu 
Ülikooli ajalugu, I, 229b)
Benito Pereira De communibus omnium rerum 
principiis libri quindecim
† 1610, Spanish Jesuit and 
exegete
9  In tables 2 and 3 there are only authors who are cited by name or by book and can 
be considered scientifi c – citations of ancient poets are not represented. If the author 
cited is also mentioned in Tartu Ülikooli ajalugu 1632–1982, I, I have indicated the page 
number and column.
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Author Work cited Notes
Johann Scharf Physica, auctior et correctior; in 
qua methodo Aristotelica in scho-
lis peripatheticorum usitata pro-
ponuntur
† 1660, Lutheran theologian 
and philosopher, active in 
Wittenberg
Christoph 
Scheibler
Dispvtatio psychologica de sensi-
bus exterioribus [?]
† 1653, interpreter of Aristo-
tle and Lutheran theologian, 
active in Giessen, Marburg 
and Dortmund
Gregor Horst De Natura Humana Libri 
duo; Quorum prior de corpo-
ris structura, posterior de anima 
tractat, Ultimo elaborati, Com-
mentariis aucti, fi gurisq[ue] nobis 
Anatomicis aere incisis exornati. 
Cum praefatione de Anatomia 
vitali & mortua pro conciliatione 
Spagyricorum & Galenicorum 
plurimum inserviente
† 1636, medical scientist, 
active in Giessen, tried to 
unite Paracelsean medicine 
with Hippocratean (Tartu 
Ülikooli ajalugu, I, 238a)
Aegidius 
<Romanus>
Expositio in libros De anima Aris-
totelis cum textu
† 1316, pupil of Th omas Aqui-
nas, active in Paris
Commentaria Collegii Conimbri-
censis, Societatis Iesu, in tres libros 
Aristotelis de Anima 
Commentary of the works 
of Aristotle published by the 
Jesuits of the University of 
Coimbra (1592).
Nicolaus 
Galenus Regius
De usu partium corporis humani 
libri XVII
† ca 200, Greek medical sci-
entist  and philosopher (Tartu 
Ülikooli ajalugu, I, 32a, 229b, 
232a, 237a, 251b, 252a)
Gaius Caesarius 
Plinius 
Secundus
C. Plinii Secundi Naturalis histo-
riae opus
† 79, Roman philosopher and 
offi  cer
Armandus <de 
Bellovisu>
De declaratione diffi  cilium termi-
norum tam theologicalium, quam 
philosophiae [?]
† 1334[?], Dominican theolo-
gian and philosopher 
All Academia Gustaviana works dealing with exterior senses, ie. Lerbeckius 
(De sensibus in genere et in specie de externis), Uraelius (De visu), Emzelius 
(De sensibus in genere, et de auditu in specie), and Halenus (De sensibus), 
use mostly the same authors as Ulfsbeckius (De anima sensitiva in genere). 
Only Lerbeckius in his Disputatio philosophica de sensibus internis uses 
some authors that are not present in Ulfsbeckius. His disputation, how-
ever, concentrates mostly on interior senses (using the tripartite division 
of memoria, phantasia, and sensus communis). Th us mostly the work of 
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Ulfsbeckius is considered exemplary regarding the presentation of the 
Aristotelian worldview about sense perception in Academia Gustaviana.
Th e ideas of Descartes are presented systematically and thoroughly by 
Andreas Westerman in his disputation, De erroribus sensuum (About sense 
errors) written under Gabriel Sjöberg. Th is work originates already from 
the second period of the Academia in Tartu (Academia Gustavo-Carolina) 
and is the longest of the disputations discussed here. He is not credited 
as the author on the title page, but in the end of the preface he designates 
himself as A&R (auctor et respondens) of the disputation, thus indicating 
that the text is written by him and not by the presiding professor. Wester-
man had begun his studies in 1684 in Uppsala and was matriculated into 
Academia Gustavo-Carolina in 1690.10
Table 3. Th e literature cited in the disputation of Andreas Westerman De erroribus 
sensuum
Author Work cited Notes
Gerardus 
Joannes Vossius
Etymologicon linguae Latinae † 1649, Dutch classical phi-
lologist and theologian (Tartu 
Ülikooli ajalugu, I, 202)
Christian 
Becmann
Christiani Becmani Bornensis de 
originibus latinae linguae; qui-
bus paßim alia multa, philologiae 
propria, pro meliori vocum ac 
rerum cognitione, inserta
† 1648, German theologian
René Descartes Principia philosophiae † 1650, French philosopher, 
dies in Sweden (Tartu Ülikooli 
ajalugu, I, passim)
Antoine Le 
Grand
Institutio philosophiae secundum 
principia Renati Descartes 
† 1699, French Cartesian phi-
losopher, Franciscan (récollet)
Pierre Poiret Cogitationum rationalium 
de Deo, Anima, et malo libri 
quatuor
† 1719, French mystic and Car-
tesian philosopher, publishes 
in Holland, b iographer of 
Antoinette Bourignon, with 
quietist infl uences
Jacques Rohault Tractatus physicus † 1672, French philosopher 
and physicist, popularizer of 
Cartesianism (Tartu Ülikooli 
ajalugu, I, 251a)
10   Album academicum der Universität Dorpat, no. 1193 (309).
330 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2010, 3/4 (133/134)
Author Work cited Notes
Johann 
Rhegenius 
Clauberg
Johannis Claubergii physica con-
tracta in qua tota rerum univer-
sitas per clara & certa principia 
succincte & dilucide explicatur
† 1665, German theologian and 
Cartesian philosopher, active 
in Duisburg
Th e disputations of Ulfsbeckius and Westerman are mentioned a couple of 
times in the literature,11 but I have been unable to fi nd any at-length stud-
ies dealing with the subject of the senses in seventeenth-century Tartu.12 
Th ere is nothing in the intellect which was not fi rst in the senses13
Th e authors discussed here have very diff erent attitudes towards this the-
sis.  Ulfsbeckius understands it as a proposition not needing further proof 
and fi rst mentions it in his introductory remarks as a basis for his discus-
sion. Westerman, on the other hand, states in the middle of his disputation 
(thesis XX) that one of his goals is to show that such understanding is not 
correct, and thus in the last theses (XXV–XXVI) he arrives at the planned 
conclusions. Such diff erence mirrors well the opposing philosophical foun-
dations upon which Ulfsbeckius and Westerman build their argumenta-
tion. While Ulfsbeckius relies on Aristotle and his commentators, Wester-
man (using Descartes and his commentators as main authorities) presents 
a Platonic-Augustinian understanding of the world. 
Th e main argument of Ulfsbeckius is that the sensitive soul (anima 
sentiens) is the form (ἐντελέχεια or forma) of a being and it has three dis-
tinct faculties. Th e fi rst he mentions – relying on Jacopo Zabarella – is cog-
nition (facultas cognoscitiva), which uses internal and external senses.14 
Th ough Ulfsbeckius deals in his disputation mainly with external senses 
(sight, hearing, smell, touch, and taste), there is implicitly also indicated 
11  Tartu Ülikooli ajalugu 1632–1982, I, 220, 232; Descartes ja tema ideede jõudmine 
Baltimaile.
12   However, some of the copies of the disputations I have used carry reading marks in 
their margins, indicating that someone has studied them not long ago.
13  Nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu. Th is quotation has been commonly 
attributed to Aristotle since medieval times, but actually originates from Th omas 
Aquinas’ Quaestiones disputatae de ueritate (q 2, a 3, a 18). See also Neal Wood, “Tabula 
Rasa, Social Environmentalism, and the ‘English Paradigm’”, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 53:4 (1992), 651.
14  Ulfsbeckius mentions also the facultas appetitiva and facultas motrix. De anima 
sensitiva in genere, sec. I, thes. 6.
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the theory of interior senses, which is the main subject of studiosus Ler-
beckius in his 1639 disputation, About interior senses. He deals in his work 
with common sense (sensus communis), fantasy (phantasia), and memory 
(memoria). Th rough fi ve exterior senses and later through three interior 
senses, we receive all the information about the world and it is brought 
into the sensitive soul. Th us the sensitive soul is also present in animals 
and – according to some authors like Gerolamo Cardano – even in plants.15 
On the other hand, according to Cartesian understanding of the soul, 
there are no possibilites to assign a soul to animals (and certainly not 
to plants). So within the Cartesian framework, animals and plants are 
considered automates who respond to external stimuli (animalia mere 
automatica).16 Th e Cartesian soul (res cogitans), what animals lack and is 
present only in humans, is similar to the concept of nous of Plotinos and to 
Augustine’s understanding of soul. Th is ego cogito or nous is the immate-
rial human soul, which partakes in the immaterial, perfect, and all-encom-
passing nous, which in itself is nothing other than God, through whom 
and because of whom any truth becomes possible.17 
In other words, while the Aristotelian worldview presents the (human) 
mind as a tabula rasa, initially empty and featureless but upon which some-
thing can be written,18 then the Cartesian view is that all humans are already 
in possession of eternal truths but the mind is too occupied with external 
sense data or does simply not pay enough attention to them. Th us one of 
the main goals of the Meditations of Descartes is to draw the mind away 
from the senses.19 In light of such observations, it is easily understandable 
why the senses lead us to error, and only by contemplating through intel-
lect and recognizing only  clear and distinct intuitions are we able to gain 
some true understanding about the world.
Taking such starting points, the authors have very diff erent attitudes 
towards senses. Ulfsbeckius takes them to be the sources of all knowledge 
about the world and describes them systematically beginning from the 
15  De anima sensitiva in genere, sec. I, thes. 4.
16  De sensibus brutorum, 2. 
17  Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 262ff .
18  “Oportet autem sic sicut in tabula nichil est actu scriptum, quod quidem accidit in 
intellectu”, Guillelmus de Morbeka reuisor translationis Aristotelis secundum Aquinatis 
librum – De anima, liber: 3, cap.: 4 [S. Th omae de Aquino Opera omnia, tom. XLV, 1: 
Sentencia libri de anima, (Roma: Commissio Leonina, 1984) [A.L. XII.2]]. Th e later 
ideas of John Locke about tabula rasa are defi nitely infl uenced by such Aristotelian 
understanding. See Wood, “Tabula Rasa”, 651ff .
19  Descartes describes this in his synopsis to the fi rst meditation (viamque facillimam 
sternat ad mentem a sensibus abducendam), AT VII 12.
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noblest (seeing) and concluding with the lowest (touch). Westerman, on the 
other hand, is not interested in the description of the senses but of the vari-
ous errors they produce, and thus his disputation is in great part an engag-
ing and interesting description of diff erent sense lapses and their reasons.
What makes perception possible?
Th e decisive diff erences between the Aristotelian and Cartesian under-
standing of perception arise from the question of what makes perception 
possible. According to the medieval Aristotelian theory of perception all 
things are perceived through their species, which reach our sense organs. 
What  the nature of species is exactly was the subject of intense debates 
already in the medieval period. Also, adding to the confusion, later authors 
(including Westerman) tend to understand species in a way that is suitable 
for them and not always in accord with the Aristotelian concept. 
Th e species, as it was understood by many medieval and most early 
modern Aristotelian authors, can be described as a unit of perception. In 
the spirit of early modern disputations, which stated that the knowledge 
or etymology of the word oft en makes us more aware of the content,20 it is 
important to see the connection between species and visual representation. 
In a way it is possible to understand it as a synonym of forma. Th is termi-
nological vagueness arose probably from the situation where the Greek 
words εἶδος and μορφή were translated by diff erent medieval translators 
of Aristotle without any defi nite system as either species or forma.21 
Th e word εἶδος is already used by Homer and also Presocratics (Empe-
docles, Democritus) who applied this word when meaning ‘that which is 
seen’, ‘appearance’, or ‘shape’.22 Later the word was not so much used to 
denote outward appearance, but ‘nature’ or ‘constitution.’ Such is also the 
etymologigal background of the Latin word ‘species’ – what was used to 
denote ‘contour’ or ‘appearance’ from as early as by Plautus but at the time 
of Cicero was already similar in meaning to the Greek ἰδέα.23 
20  “Cognitio quippe verborum multum saepe facit ad notitiam rerum hauriendam”, 
De erroribus sensuum, thes. I. 
21  Leen Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 2: from perception to knowledge. Renaissance con-
troversies, later scholasticism, and the elimination of the intelligible species in modern 
philosophy, Brill’s studies in intellectual history, 49 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 101ff .
22  Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon, εἶδος.
23  “Hanc illi ἰδέαν appellabant [...] nos recte speciem possumus dicere”, Cicero, Acade-
mica, I.30. Charlton T. Lewis & Charles Short, A Latin dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1879), species.
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Th us eidos became by Aristotle (De anima) the soul or form or the 
complete reality of the body (Aristotle uses the words εἶδος, μορφή, and 
ἐντελέχεια, which were all understood by Ulfsbeckius to be synonyms24). 
Such an understanding of the soul was ethusiastically adopted when  Greek 
philosophy became once again available to Western authors aft er nearly 
half a millennium. Th e most notable and infl uential of Latin authors was 
by far Th omas Aquinas. In spite of some initial resistance to such a the-
ological understanding of the human body and soul25 – ideas that were 
mostly conveyed through Islamic texts and translations – the Aristote-
lian philosophical view was nearly universally adopted during the four-
teenth century. Th e fact that Th omas Aquinas was pronounced a saint in 
1323 and later doctor ecclesiae (1567) was of course an indicator and at the 
same time propagator of that philosophical attitude. It was deemed com-
mon knowledge that a human being is an unseparable unifi cation of soul 
(species, forma) and body. Th e example that Aristotle uses and Th omas 
Aquinas comments on is such:
[...] there is no more reason to ask whether soul and body together make 
one thing than to ask the same about wax and the impression sealed on 
it, or about any other matter and its form. For, as is shown in the Met-
aphysics, Book VIII, form is directly related to matter as the actuality 
of matter; once matter actually is it is informed. [...] Th erefore, just as 
the body gets its being from the soul, as from its form, so too it makes a 
unity with this soul to which it is immediately related.26
Sense perception in the Aristotelian framework occurs when the actual-
ity of a thing reaches us from the exterior world – through its species that 
24  De anim. sens. sec. 1, thes. 3.
25  See Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Th eologie an der Universität von 
Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte = Aft er the condemna-
tion of 1277: philosophy and theology at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the 
thirteenth century. Studies and texts, ed. by Jan Aertsen, Kent Emery & Andreas Speer, 
Miscellanea mediaevalia, 28 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000).
26  Aristotle and Th omas Aquinas, Aristotle’s De anima, trans. by Kenelm Foster and 
Silvester Humphries, Rare masterpieces of philosophy and science (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1959), 172. “Et hoc est quod dicit quod non oportet quaerere si ex anima 
et corpore fi t unum, sicut nec dubitatur circa ceram et fi guram, neque omnino circa 
aliquam materiam et formam, cuius est materia. Ostensum est enim in octavo meta-
physicae quod forma per se unitur materiae, sicut actus eius; et idem est materiam uniri 
formae, quod materiam esse in actu. […] Et ideo sicut corpus habet esse per animam, 
sicut per formam, ita et unitur animae immediate, inquantum anima est forma corporis”, 
Th omas de Aquino, In Aristotelis libros De anima II et III, liber: 2, lectio: 1, numerus: 234. 
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is received by senses and transmitted to the brain by nerves.27 It is impor-
tant to stress that the intelligible species is not to be confused with the pla-
tonic idea – species is always a representation of a thing and only aft er the 
cognoscitive power operates we are brought to some understanding of the 
object.28 Th e problematic question is in which way the species of a thing 
reaches us. Here it is reasonable to lay out two diff erent opinions which 
vary in stress on the operational qualities of the species: (1) the species is 
intentional and thus more of a psychological object; (2) the species is mov-
ing through a medium, mechanistically multiplying itself. It is possible to 
see the diff erent viewpoints on the ontological status of the species. In the 
fi rst case, human attention is stressed and only through cooperation with 
the intellect the understanding of the object is achieved – the understand-
ing which is represented by the concept of spiritual species.29 Th e second 
position sees species more as active in itself and stresses that all objects 
emit its species in all directions and imprint the sensitive soul as a stamp 
imprints its form onto wax. Th us it is also possible to see two perspectives 
that bring, in one case, the active (psychological) side of the intellect into 
the foreground and, in the other case, its passive side and stress the mech-
anistic and perspectivist understanding of the propagation of species.30
Th e most well known and even canonical representative of the fi rst 
position is considered to be Th omas Aquinas,31 while the second position is 
represented by perspectivists such as Roger Bacon.32 Th is later perspectivist 
27  “Hoc etiam objectum ad sensationem confere ut facultatem ipsam de potentia in 
actum traducat, imprimendo suam speciem, quae alias spiritalis item intentionalis 
dicitur”, De an. sen. sec. 1, thes. 13. “Cerebrum esse primum sensorium”, De an. sen. 
sec. 1, thes. 20.
28  “Sed benefi cio spiritalis speciei Reale objectum repraesentantis, sese in sensorium 
insinuat, atque potentiam sensitivam, ad actum sentiendi eliciendum exitat”, De sensibus 
in genere, et de auditu in specie, thes. 14.
29  “Quod sensile in sensorium agat spiritualiter, scilicet emittendo speciem spiritalem”, 
De an. sen. sec. 1, thes. 15. 
30  “Nam sensus ad duo potest referri: 1) Quando ad speciem sensibilem referetur, sensus 
est in potentia passiva, quia illae species recipiuntur in sensu & recipere est pati. [...] 
2) Quando referetur ad actum sentiendi, est in potentia activa, quia illum profert ac 
producit”, De an. sen. sec. 1, thes. 16. 
31  Leen Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 1: classical roots and Medieval discussions, Brill’s 
studies in intellectual history, 48 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 156ff .
32  Roger Bacon, Roger Bacon and the origins of Perspectiva in the Middle Ages: a critical 
edition and English translation of Bacon’s Perspectiva, with introduction and notes, ed. 
& trans. by David Lindberg (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University 
Press, 1996), lxviii ff . David Lindberg, Th eories of vision from al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), 113–114.
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theory is the one that infl uenced Descartes and upon which his theories 
of vision and light are a great deal dependent.33
Still, both positions are in agreement on the issue that sense perception 
and cognition are essentially connected, if we bear in mind the proposi-
tion that “there is nothing in the intellect which was not fi rst in the senses”. 
Th rough species we receive the properties of things that can be perceived 
by several senses as is the case with motion, stillness, shape, number, and 
magnitude,34 or are only specifi c to some sense as color is to the eye, what 
ear does not hear, as well as eye does not perceive sound.35 All these percep-
tions are processed throughcommon sense, which is located in the heart 
according to Aristotle, or in the brain according to Galenos.36 Ulfsbeck-
ius here accepts both positions and says that secundum radicationem, or 
common sense, originates from the heart, but  secundum operationem, or 
operationally, from the brain, for it is the brain to which is connected to 
the nerves from diff erent sense organs.
Westerman presents in his disputation a very diff erent view and states 
that all perception is just local movement37 and we can abandon qualities 
and species altogether. Th is can also be viewed as a logical next step of 
the perspectivistic theory of vision and perception. Th us light is nothing 
more the movement of small particles of aether, sound is the stroked or 
percussed air that moves the tympanic membrane, pain is anything that 
induces vehement motion in our bodies. It can be concluded that sensation 
takes place when something material agitates our senses, but these mate-
rial particles do not carry or represent real qualities.38 Th is is explained by 
this citation from Descartes:
33  A. Mark Smith, Descartes’s theory of light and refraction: a discourse on method 
(Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987), 8ff .
34  “Motus, quies, fi gura, numerus & magnitudo”, De an. sen. sec. 1, thes. 18. 
35  “Color [...] non enim auditur ab aure, nec sonus videtur ab oculo”, De an. sen. sec. 
1, thes. 18. Emzelius in his De auditu, thes. 13 list here “color, sonus, odor, sapor & 
qualitates tactiles”. 
36  “Organon hoc est vel Commune vel proprium. De illo variae apud antiquos extiterunt 
sententiae. Quidam statuunt illud esse in corde ut Aristoteles, quidam in Cerebro ut 
Galenus”, De an. sen. sec. 1, thes. 20.
37  “Quid ab objectis in organa sensoria agat? Hoc ipsum motum esse locale”, De. err. 
sens. thes. IV.
38  “Nec concipiamus aliud quidquam a sensuum externorum organis ad cerebrum nos-
trum transire, praeter ejusmodi motum. Si enim descendere velimus ad qualitetes sive 
species vulgo sensibiles dictas, inveniemus omnes per illum clarissime explicari posse. 
Nam quid est lumen, nisi motus substantiae aetheriae, sive globulorum aetheriorum, 
ex vehementi agitatione materiae subtilis originem ducens. Quid sonus, nisi ictus & 
percussus aer, qui tympanum, auditus organum movet. Quid dolor, nisi motus aliquis 
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And we see that this local motion produces not only sensations of pain 
and pleasure but also those of light  and sound. If someone is struck in 
the eye, so that the vibration of the blow reaches the retina, this will 
cause him to see many sparks of fl ashing light, yet the light is not outside 
his eye. And if someone puts a fi nger in his ear he will hear a throbbing 
hum which comes simply from the movement of air trapped in the ear. 39
Westerman comments that when hitting the eye, coarser matter (viz air) 
escapes and fi ner matter (viz light and aether) enters.40 Here we can recog-
nize the Cartesian distinction of diff erent types of matter, of which (1) the 
most subtle one is aether and the light particles that fi ll the whole room, 
(2) coarser particles of what diff erent fl uids are composed (air is also con-
sidered a type of liquid), and fi nally (3) the bulkiest particles that compose 
solid bodies. In essence all those particles are the same, with diff erences 
occurring only in size.41 How these particles behave is exemplifi ed by West-
erman with a classic description of lightning and thunder:
Th us follows that thunder and lightning happen about the same time, 
but in spite of that we see lightning before we hear the thunder. Because 
of the fi ne aether our sense of sight is fi rst agitated, but the thunder, what 
originates from the collision of clouds, must pass through the coarser 
air to be able to bring sound to our ears.42
It follows that our sense organs do not receive any other information from 
the world besides those particles, which due to their properties do not carry 
any other information than the direction of their motion (indicating the 
extension of the object), their size, velocity, and spin. Qualities such as 
colors, tastes, and smells reach us due to the diff erent motion of the par-
ticles, which gain diff erent spin and velocity due to the properties of the 
vehementior in membra nostra agens [...] Concludere itaque licet, omnem sensum ex 
contactu mutuo partium, quae localiter in nobis moventur, fi eri”, De. err. sens. thes. IV.
39  Principia philosophiae, 4.198, René Descartes, Th e philosophical writings of Descartes. 
Vol.1, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff , and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 284 [AT VIII A 322].
40  “Causa vibrationis illius in oculo facile dari potest, quod scilicet expellatur materia 
crassior, nempe aër, & infl uat materia subtilis, quae tunicas movet, cujus deinde agita-
tionis mens conscia fi t”, De. err. sens. thes. IV.
41  Le Monde, 4, Descartes, Th e philosophical writings of Descartes, 1, 85 [AT XI 17].
42 “Unde patet tonitru & fulgur eodem fere momento fi eri, nihilominus fulgur prius 
videmus, ob subtilem aethera, qui prius visum nostrum movere, quam fragor ex con-
cursu nubium oriens, crassum aera penetrare, sonumque ad aures nostras derivare 
queat”, De err. sens. thes. XIII.
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surfaces they bounce off . Th ese motions we perceive as tastes, smells, or 
colors – qualities that as such do not exist outside our cognition.43 
Presenting such a mechanistic theory of perception, Westerman also 
critisizes some understanding of species. He maintains that (1) species can-
not be a body (corpus), (2) species cannot be an immaterial entity (spiritus), 
and (3) species can not be equalled with ideas (similes esse ideis).
Th e fi rst is impossible as it is altogether unclear how such species are pro-
duced by bodies, how they are emitted, and how our sense organs receive 
and transfer them to our brains.44 Against the possibility that the species 
are similar to Platonic ideas, Westerman argues – quite correctly – that 
if there were Platonic ideas emitting from bodies then everybody would 
understand the things in exactly the same way and sense errors would be 
impossible, which is a completely mistaken position as experience proves 
more than suffi  ciently.45
It can be also argued that words bring to our mind diff erent things, 
but those words are not at all similar to the things, situations, and persons 
they remind us of.46 Th is is of course a (willfully?) mistaken understand-
ing of the species theory, but wholly consistent with the Cartesian theory 
of perception which states that contrary to species we are perceiving only 
the motion of particles that are brought to the pineal gland, the primary 
link between body and soul.47 In the pineal gland, the motion of particles 
stirs the soul to bring up diff erent ideas.48 We see here quite clearly that the 
material we receive from the outside world is in itself quite poor in infor-
mation, and only in the interpretation of diff erent motions do we gain 
some content. According to this it is possible to separate the reception of 
some basic characteristics of a thing, which is the work of diff erent sense 
43  “Constitunt enim qulitates gustabiles in certa dispositione corporis sapidi, secundum 
magnitudinem, fi guram situm, motum et mensuram partium; pro quorum diversitate 
diversae saporum species exsurgunt”, De err. sens. thes. XIII.
44  “Videre enim nequimus, quomodo tales imagines ab objectis provenire possunt, aut 
qua vi objecta illas producant & quomodo tandem organa sensoria illas recipiant & ad 
cerebrum deferant”, De. err. sens. thes. V.
45  “Hoc enim si forent, ab uno eodemque objecto semper unius generis species emitti 
debeant, quas uniformiter omnes perciperent, quod falsum esse, quotidiana experientia, 
infallibilis illa rerum magistra, satis superque docet”, De. err. sens. thes. VI.
46  “Vel quamnam convenientiam habent verba, signa illa arbitraria, sive ore prolata, 
sive scripto consignata fuerint, cum rebus, quas denotant”, De. err. sens. thes. VI.
47  “Omnes enim nervi, quorum ope mens conscia fi t rerum externarum, ad cerebrum 
sive glandulam, prope fontem spirituum animalium, positam, coeunt, ut fi brae nervo-
rum, in eis undique agere queant”, De. err. sens. thes. VII.
48  “Nam ea animae nostrae est natura, ut diversi motus locales suffi  ciant ad diversas 
in illa ideas excitandas”, De. err. sens. thes. VII.
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organs, and the perception of it as something, which is purely an act of the 
mind. In support of such diff erentiation, it is possible to show that people 
who have suff ered a stroke or otherwise have brain damage may not have 
the capacity to sense certain body parts anymore and may be unaware of 
infl icted pain – in other words, perceiving pain is purely a mental act.49 
Here the author makes an important comment about the trustworthi-
ness of senses – that the senses are never wrong because they receive and 
transmit information. Error takes place only in the mind, when we make 
an erroneous decision based on the sense data. Th is leads also to the under-
standing that things and the ideas of them are very diff erent, even so that:
It is more reasonable to draw an analogy or comparison between colors 
and sounds than between corporeal things and their sensible ideas and 
God.50
In this respect we should be suspicious towards sense data – it is very easy 
to arrive at wrong conclusions relying primarily on perception. Th is is the 
reason behind applying methodological doubt to the sciences. Th is does 
not mean that true understanding of things outside our mind is impos-
sible, but we ought to be cautious not to let the senses dominate. Th is is 
possible due to the fact that our minds are somewhat similar to God’s, or 
as Descartes puts it:
For I readily and freely confess that the idea which we have of the di-
vine intellect, for example, does not diff er from that which we have of 
our own intellect, except in so far as the idea of an infi nite number dif-
fers from the idea of a number raised to the second or fourth power. And 
the same applies to the individual attributes of God of which we recog-
nize some trace in ourselves.51
Foremost, such similarity means that we are in a way participants of the 
objective reality which is in other words the eternal truth that is proceed-
ing from God.52 Descartes does not imply that we have those truths in us 
49  “Perceptionem sic in cerebro peractam, alius quidam mentis actus sequitur, qui 
conclusionem fert, res tales esse, quales idea de illis formata, exhibet. Est que hic actus 
mere mentalis”, De. err. sens. thes. VII.
50  “Analogie sive paritatis fi ngi potest inter colores & sonos quam inter res corporeas 
vel earum sensibiles ideas & Deum. P. Poire. Cogit. Rat”. Th e passage is slightly diff erent 
in Descartes second reply to the second objection [AT VII 136].
51  René Descartes, Th e philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol.2., trans. John Cotting-
ham, Robert Stoothoff , and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 98 [2 reply to the 2 objection] [AT VII 137].
52  Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 276.
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already fully formed, but he insists that as we have the possibility to reach 
the truth and as the intelligible world (or the ideal world) is the only real 
one, then all bodily objects are understandable and furthermore existent 
through ideas.53 To illustrate this, Westerman brings an example from the 
second meditation of Descartes:
As we are seeing (to use the words of Descartes) somebody passing by 
in the street below, we are saying that these are humans and yet we do 
not see beyond hats and cloaks that might cover artifi cial machines.54 
He of course adds the famous example about a piece of wax that can change 
almost all its properties, but intellectually we can be certain that this is still 
the same piece of wax.55 Later Westerman demonstrates thoroughly with 
diff erent examples that there is much more that we grasp very clearly with 
the intellect but have only vague or erroneous sense data about the same 
things – not only due to the fact that our senses are oft en inadequate to 
receive the information and are weaker than those of most animals. Fur-
thermore we are able to understand things that are not visible at all or too 
far away. Th us it follows that we have some access to eternal ideas – the 
mind penetrates the nature of things, while senses discern only the exte-
rior of things.56 
Having thus demonstrated what perception is and how it occurs, both 
authors move on to describe specifi c senses. For both Ulfsbeckius and 
Westerman, the fi rst sense to be described is seeing, but for very diff er-
ent reasons. Ulfsbeckius holds seeing important (like Aristotle) as “in this 
sense object, organ and the medium between them are clearer than in other 
senses. It follows that vision is nobler than other senses and thus the fi rst”.57
Ulfsbeckius briefl y discusses whether seeing takes place as extramission 
(as Platonics) or intromission (as Aristotelians) or as a combined intro- and 
extramission (as Galenos).58 He reaches the conclusion that only the theory 
53  Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 357–358.
54  “Sic cum videamus (ut Cartesii verba faciam mea) ex fenestra aliquem praetereuntem 
in platea, dicimus hominem praeterire, cum nihil praeter pileos & vestes, sub quibus 
automa [!] quoddam latere potest, videamus”, De. err. sens. thes. XI.
55  De. err. sens. thes. XI. 
56  “Illa est, quae intimam rerum essentiam penetrat, cum sensus exteriora saltim 
delibent”, De err. sens. thes. XXV.
57  “Quia in hoc sensu objecta, organa & media magis perspicua sunt, quam in reliquis 
sensibus. Ergo visus ceateris est nobilior, atque praemittitur”, De an. sen. sec. 2, thes. 4. 
58  De an. sen. sec. 2, thes. 6. Ulfsbeckius does not name here Galenos by name but 
Lerbeckius in his work (De sensibus in genere et in specie de externis, thes. 21) identifi es 
Galenos as the author of such combined theory. Regarding Galenos’s theory see Lind-
berg, Th eories of vision, 38.
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of intromission is correct. Th is theory holds that a sense organ, colored 
object, transparent medium, and light to illuminate the object are neces-
sary for seeing. Having given a short overview of the subjects mentioned, 
Ulfsbeckius moves on to describe the composition of the eye and nerves 
and touches also upon the Aristotelian theory of color perception, indicat-
ing that color is the visible quality that appears at the very extremes of an 
object.59 Light is needed to actualize the color in the transparent medium, 
as without it color exists on the extremes of an object only potentially.60 
Th us a white object is white when it is in full light and not visible when 
there is no light as the colors are unable to actualize. 
Westerman places seeing in his disputation as the fi rst sense under dis-
cussion, but for the reason that as there are more things discernible through 
sight than the other senses, and so through sight we err the most.61 West-
erman is not interested in the ancient theories of vision and is assuming 
the intromission theory. Also, the composition of the eye is for him of no 
notable importance. He rather starts off  by introducing promptly the Car-
tesian theory about colors. He denies that colours are somehow existent in 
light. Th is is also the case with Aristotelian theory of colors, but the thing 
that diff ers from the Aristotelian view is that diff erent colors are medi-
ated to us through the diff erent speeds of the particles that reach us from 
objects.62 Th e diff erent characteristics of materials cause the particles to 
spin diff erently and this is interpreted by us as colors – i.e. colors are ideas 
that have no real existence outside the intellectual sphere. 
To corroborate such a conclusion, Westerman draws attention – with 
a well-known example from Rohault – to the fact that when a sense organ 
is somehow injured it may very well be that this injury alters our sense 
perception:
However I would not doubt to affi  rm that just as it oft en happens that 
the same food at the same time raises quite diff erent tastes in two dif-
ferent persons, similarly it can be that two men have very diff erent sen-
sations when looking at the same object; in such things I am the more 
convinced because I have an singular personal experience of it. For it 
59  “Color sit qualitas appares in extrema superfi cie corporis terminati”, De an. sen. 
sec. 2, thes. 12.  
60  Arist. De anima, 2.7.
61  “Cum enim plura objecta oculus subjiciantur, quam reliquis sensibus, igitur hic 
variis, prae reliquis, est obnoxius erroribus”, De err. sens. thes. XII.
62  According to Cartesian theory, light is a “movement or action, very rapid and very 
lively, which passes toward our eyes through the medium of the air and other transparent 
bodies”. Smith, Descartes’s theory of light and refraction, 13.
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happened once that my right eye was weakened and injured, by look-
ing for more than twelve hours trough a telescope (ope conspicilliorum 
Batavicorum) at a naval battle that was going on a mile and a half away; 
I now fi nd my vision so aff ected that when I look at yellow objects with 
my right eye, they do not appear to me as they used to, nor as they now 
appear when I observe them with the left . And what is remarkable is that 
I do not notice the same variation in all colors I deliberate, but only in 
some, such as green, for example, which appears close to blue when I 
observe it with the right eye. Th is experience of mine makes me believe 
that there are perhaps some men who are born with, and retain all their 
life, the disposition that I currently have in one of my eyes and that there 
perhaps are others who have the disposition that I enjoy in the other.63
It would be possible to interpret this example diff erently and fi nd no sup-
port for the idea that colors are something other than sensible qualities. 
Even the supporters of the Aristotelian theory of vision would agree that 
when a sense organ is injured the perception is altered. Th is similarity is 
also refl ected in the concluding remarks of thesis XII of Westerman’s dis-
putation: “because of diff erences in sense organs, objects and the medium 
between them erroneous perceptions about color oft entimes happen”.64 
Th is refl ects very closely the conditions that must be met for correct vision 
by Ulfsbeckius (see above). Sense errors were not an unknown subject for 
those who favored the species theory, and thus we fi nd the greater part of 
the examples presented by Westerman already presented by Roger Bacon, 
63  “Id tamen asserere non dubitabo, ut saepe contingit eundem cibum eodem tempore 
in duobus diversis hominibus, varios sapores referre; ita quoque fi eri posse, ut duo 
homines valde dissentiant circa judicum de eodem visus objecto: Eoque magis rei 
securus sum, quod de re mihi constet per experientiam omnino singularem: cum enim 
aliquando mihi contigisset, ut a diuturno conspectu, ultra duodecim horas protracto, 
ope conspicilliorum Batavicorum, pugnae navalis, procul a me sesquimiliaris spatio 
commissae, oculus dexter fatigatus et & off ensus fuisset, eo jam in statu visum meum 
constitutum deprehendo, ut si fl ava objecta conspiciam oculo dextro, non ut ante, talia 
mihi appareant, nec qualia oculo sinistro repraesentantur. Et quod mirum est, non 
eandem varietatem in omnibus coloribus a me animadverti, sed solium in quibusdam, 
ut, exempli gratia, in viridi, qui mihi accedere videtur ad caeruleum, si intueor oculo 
dextro. Experientia ea facit ut credam, quosdam homines nasci ea dispositione perenni 
praeditos, quae nunc oculorum meorum uni infi xa est, ac forte aliis adesse eadem, 
quae alteri meo oculo inest”, Jacques Rohault, Tractatus physicus (Amsterdam: Apud 
Johannem Pauli, 1691), 1.27.6, 178. See also Jacques Rohault, Rohault’s system of natural 
philosophy, illustrated with Dr. Samuel Clarke’s notes taken mostly out of Sir Isaac Newton’s 
Philosophy, I (London: James & Knapton, 1735), 197.
64  “Hinc est, quod pro frequenti tam organorum, quam objectorum & medii varietate, 
erroneae de coloribus ferri soleant conclusiones”, De err. sens. thes. XII.
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Peter of Limoges, or Claudius Coelestinus.65 Th us it can be argued that the 
main diff erence between the Cartesian and Aristotelian understanding of 
colors can be understood as the diff erence between the physical and psy-
chological understanding of seeing. 
Moving on from colors, Westerman discusses more illusions and errors 
and also diff erent natural phenomena. Mostly he does this in order to 
present the Cartesian worldview, but sometimes also to add other expla-
nations that have very little to do with Cartesian philosophy. One of the 
most interesting ones is of course the so-called moon illusion. Here West-
erman presents the physiological explanation for such an event, relying on 
Johannes Claubergius. He states that the illusion happens when the moon 
or the sun are close to the horizon, and other objects like trees or hills are 
being also in the line of sight. Due to the proximity of other objects, our 
pupil contracts itself and thus the sun seems larger.66 Th is explanation 
derives a bit from the Cartesian explanation, for Descartes explained the 
moon illusion as our mind interpreting the distance and calculating the 
size of the object, ie. psychologically. Already in the thirteenth century 
the moon illusion was usually explained in this way (the main source of 
this being Alhacen), and in the seventeenth century it was also the most 
common explanation. Popular but incorrect explanations of the illusion 
included refraction of the atmosphere and also atmospheric haze, which 
makes the objects fainter and thus interpreted as larger and further away.67 
Westerman also discusses the stars and argues against the already very 
outdated Ptolemaian worldview that it would be erroneous to think that 
sky is somehow similar to a painted vault. Visible stars can be even greater 
than the sun and seem small only due to their vast remoteness. Th eir dif-
ferent brightness that is discussed already by ancient authors is explained 
by their diff erent distances from us.68
Some described errors no doubt also derive from Westerman’s own 
experience and observations, like the fact that Estonian and Finnish people 
65  Bacon, Perspectiva; Meelis Friedenthal, Tallinna Linnaarhiivi Tractatus moralis 
de Oculo, Dissertationes theologiae Universitatis Tartuensis 13 (Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli 
Kirjastus, 2008); Claudius Coelestinus, De his que mundo mirabiliter eveniunt: ubi de 
sensuum erroribus et potentiis anime, ac de infl uentiis caelorum (Paris: Apud Simonem 
Colinaeum, 1542).
66  “Corpora namque quo viciniora nobis sunt, eo magis coarctatur pupilla oculi”, De 
err. sens. thes. XIV 
67  Frances Egan, “Th e moon illusion”, Philosophy of Science, 65:4 (December 1998), 
604–623.
68  De err. sens. thes. XV. 
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are somehow more capable of enduring the heat of a sauna,69 or the fact 
that some people are unable to remain in a room with a cat. Th e last one is 
very likely a description of an allergy towards cats, and Westerman thinks 
that the probable culprit for such an intolerance is the smell of the cat. Th e 
reason for such a reaction is that people have been unknowingly injured 
by a cat when they were infants or a cat perhaps injured the mother when 
she was pregnant.70
Concluding remarks
Th e disputations originating from the Academia Gustaviana and Academia 
Gustavo-Carolina dealing with the sense organs and perception label their 
subject matter in diff erent ways. In three cases it is deemed a philosophical 
subject (disputatio philosophica), in three cases the subject area of phys-
ics (disputatio physica), and in one case a subject of psychology (disputa-
tio psychologica). Nowhere in their prefaces or text do the authors give any 
explanations for such categorizing and indeed seem to use those words 
almost synonymously. Th is is somewhat departing from the Aristotelian 
philosophical tradition where the soul was usually considered within the 
area of physics.71 We can only speculate here that the choice of wording in 
naming the disputation could be infl uenced by the area of expertise of the 
presiding professor. In the cases of labeling the disputation physica, the 
presiding professor is in two cases of physics (Erici Stregensis) and in one 
case of eloquence and poesy (Dau). Professors of philosophy (Savonius, 
Sjöberg) and of astronomy and physics (Schomerus) were presiding over 
philosophical disputations. Th e one psychological disputation was pre-
sided over by the second professor of theology who was also professor of 
physics and arithmetics. Th is assumption that presiding professors infl u-
enced the choice of labeling the disputation is not corroborated by the fact 
that the only other disputation in Tartu during the seventeenth century 
described s psychological (Disputatio psychologica de anima in genere by 
69  “Sic balnea suffi  centi non gaudere calore dicit Fenno vel Livonus, quae alius nationis 
homo vix ingredi potest”, De err. sens. thes. XXIV.
70  “Quidam effl  uvia et odores de fele exeuntes optime tolerant, quos tamen alii ut 
pessimum quodvis fugiunt, adeo ut in eadem cum fele domo manere nequeant. Hanc 
autem aversionem inscius quis vel in utero matris, vel in ipsa infantia contraxit, cum 
aut mater tempore gestations aut ipse in cunis a fele laesus fuerit, quae idea cerebro tunc 
impressa continuo manet”, De err. sens. thes. XXIII.
71  Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, Cambridge history of 17th-century philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 956.
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Nicolaus Prytz, 1634) is presided by a professor of philosophy. When look-
ing at other disputations dealing with the subject of the soul, it appears 
that even under the same professor the disputation could be called either 
physical or philosophical.
Despite the diff erences of the titles, the disputations of the Academia 
Gustaviana period are remarkably similar and deal with the senses accord-
ing to the Aristotelian tradition. Th ere is little or no controversy and most 
of the problems (e.g., the question of understanding the intelligible spe-
cies) are glossed over. Regardless of that, it is evident that the authors are 
suffi  ciently well acquainted with the subject of the senses and perception 
within the Aristotelian framework. Still, mostly textbook literature and 
rather general treatments are used and some of the contemporary and more 
scholarly treatments of the subject of sense perception and anatomy of the 
sense organs are absent.72 As the last work from the period of Academia 
Gustaviana dealt with in this essay is from 1655, it is not very surprising 
that the new Cartesian ideas had not yet arrived to Tartu. It was still only 
ten years aft er the publication of Descartes’ Principia philosophiae and fi ve 
years aft er the author had died in Stockholm. 
Th e works from the second period of the Academia in Tartu (Academia 
Gustavo-Carolina) are quite diff erent in character. Both authors (Wester-
man and Carstenius) were very well acquainted with the Cartesian world-
view, and presented it systematically and polemically against the ideas of 
the Aristotelian tradition. In these disputations we can see no traces of a 
fi erce opposition to “modern” Cartesian philosophy that was common in 
the middle of the century in other universities, e.g., in Uppsala. 
Meelis Friedenthal (b. 1973) is a Senior Researcher at the Tartu University 
Library.
72  E.g. Alhacen, Johannes Kepler, Felix Platter, Hieronymus Fabricius are nowhere 
mentioned in connection with senses.
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Ko kkuvõte: Tajukäsitlused 17. sajandi Academia Gustaviana’s ja 
Gustavo-Carolina’s
Mitmes mõttes on meeltetajud 17. sajandil toimunud fi losoofi lise pöörde 
keskmes. Selle otsustamiseks piisab, kui vaadelda Descartes’i esimest medi-
tatsiooni – mida Descartes ei taha seal enam usaldada, on teadmised, mis 
on saadud mitte mõistuse abil, vaid meeleliselt. Kuigi mediteerija ei ütle 
seda kusagil otse välja, on siinkohal tegemist eelkõige rünnakuga aristo-
telismi vastu. Selline erinevus meeltetajudesse suhtumisel on jälgitav ka 
17. sajandi Tartu ülikooli disputatsioonides. Artiklis käsitletud kaheksa dis-
putatsiooni katavad perioodi alates kaks aastat pärast ülikooli asutamist 
(1634) kuni selle Tartust Pärnusse üleviimiseni (1699). Väga laias laastus 
saab need tööd jagada kaheks. Esimesed kuus (aastatest 1634–55) tegelevad 
aristotelesliku füüsikaga ja viimased kaks (aastatest 1692 ja 1699) võtavad 
arvesse ka Descartes’i ja teiste moodsamate autorite teooriaid. Kuigi kar-
tesiaanlikku pööret on Eesti kontekstis käsitletud teatavas mõttes skeptit-
sismi (pürronismi) väljendusena ning metodoloogilise kahtluse esiplaanile 
seadjana, siis on siinse töö eesmärgiks näidata, kuidas otsustav erinevus 
eelnevast aristoteleslikust traditsioonist tuleneb mitte niivõrd metodoloo-
gilisest kahtlusest, kuivõrd augustiinlik-platoonilise maailmavaate süste-
maatilisest taasesitamisest.
Kõige põhjalikumaks aristotelesliku maailmapildi esitajaks on oma 
ülesehituse süstemaatilisuse ja allikate kasutamise poolest Magnus Ulfs-
beckiuse disputatsioon Disputatio inauguralis, de anima sensitiva in genere, 
et in specie de sensibus exterioribus (Aistivast hingest üldiselt ja välismeel-
test eriti, 1634). Descartes’i ideid esitab põhjalikult ja üsna süstemaatiliselt 
Andreas Westerman oma dissertatsioonis Dissertatio philosophica de erro-
ribus sensuum (Meelepetetest), mis pärineb Academia Gustavo-Carolina 
perioodist (1692). 
Mõlemal autoril on töid kirjutades olnud oluliseks alguspunktiks erinev 
arusaam juba Aristotelesele omistatud teesist, et midagi pole olemas vai-
mus enne, kui see on meelte poolt tajutud. Ulfsbeckius tajub seda tõesta-
mist mittevajava väitena ning toob selle juba sissejuhatuses välja kui aluse, 
millele tuginedes edasine töö on kirjutatud. Westerman seevastu seab oma 
töö keskel eesmärgiks näidata, et nimetatud arusaam ei pea paika ning 
viimastes teesides jõuabki kokkuvõtlikult planeeritud järeldusele. Selline 
seisukohtade erinevus peegeldab erinevaid fi losoofi lisi taustu, millele Ulfs-
beckius ja Westerman tuginevad. Kui Ulfsbeckius toetub Aristotelesele ja 
tema kommentaatoritele, siis Westermani seisukohad on koos Descartes’i 
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ja tema kommentaatoritega pigem uusplatoonlik-augustinuslikud. Ehk tei-
sisõnu, kui aristoteleslik maailmapilt esitab (inim)vaimu kui tabula rasat, 
millele saab potentsiaalselt kirjutada, aga mis on algselt täiesti tühi, siis 
kartesiaanlik maailmapilt eeldab, et inimesel on olemas kõik tõed kaasa-
sündinud moel, ta lihtsalt ei pööra nendele piisavalt tähelepanu või on liig-
selt hõivatud meelteandmetega. Niiviisi meeltetajusid käsitledes on ilmne, 
et need viivad meid enamasti lihtsalt eksiteele ja vaid vaimus kontemplee-
rides ning vaid neid asjaolusid tunnistades, mida me mõistame selgelt ja 
täpselt, on võimalik saada tõest informatsiooni maailma kohta. Selliselt 
tegelevadki käsitletavad autorid meeltega väga erinevalt. Ulfsbeckiuse dis-
putatsioon võtab ette ja kirjeldab neid süstemaatiliselt kui kõigi teadmiste 
allikaid, alustades kõige üllamast (nägemisest) ja lõpetades kõige mada-
lamaga, mis on omane nii inimestele kui ka taimedele (kompimismeel e. 
taktiilsus). Westerman aga suhtub kõigisse meelteandmetesse kahtlusega 
ning nii ongi tema disputatsioon suures osas erinevate meelepetete kohati 
vägagi põnev ja lõbustav kirjeldus. 
